


















DRUID Working Paper No. 07-23 
 
 
Innovation in Private Infrastructure Development: Effects of the 




















Innovation in Private Infrastructure Development: Effects of the Selection 
Environment and Modularity 
 
 
Nuno Gil and Marcela Miozzo 
Manchester Business School 
The University of Manchester 
Booth Street West 
Manchester M15 6PB 
Tel.: +44 (0) 161 306 3486/3423 





This study investigates how the selection environment and modularity affect innovation in private 
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job harder because it leads to perceptions of downside risk and regulatory changes, whereas 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates the determinants of process innovation in the development of new 
physical infrastructure. Process innovations introduce new technological elements (e.g., 
machinery, IT systems, new product configurations) for achieving lower production costs 
and/or higher quality of service (Reschstein and Salter 2006). Infrastructure, such as power 
stations, airports, and railways, are a subset of CoPS, the capital, engineering- and IT-
intensive components of large technical systems (e.g., air travel, utilities) (e.g., Miller et al. 
1995, Hobday 1998). Like most CoPS, infrastructure is delivered through projects, the 
temporary multi-firm alliances that coordinate design and production decisions, enable user 
involvement in development, and match financial and technical resources (Hobday 2000a). 
CoPS projects matter for innovation to eliminate reverse salients, i.e., the components of the 
large technical systems that have fallen behind with the others (Hughes 1987). 
We combine two theoretical lenses for carrying out our study ─ the evolutionary 
economic theory of innovation (Nelson and Winter 1977, 82) and the modularity construct 
(Ulrich 1995, Baldwin and Clark 2000). The evolutionary view postulates that the processes 
that generate technological mutations operate stochastically and locally, involve uncertainty, 
and are affected by the selection environment, i.e., the socio-political, economical, regulatory, 
and technical forces that the innovation needs to overcome to succeed and be selected by the 
decision-makers (Nelson and Winter 1977, 82). Large technical systems can be regarded as 
non-market selection environments, where the relationships between firms and customers do 
not have an arm’s length quality; costs and benefits are difficult to quantify; and regulation 
cannot provide a pervasive set of incentives (Nelson and Winter 1977).  
 The design view of technological evolution postulates that modularity is the force that 
allows the creation of value, the dispersion of value across firms, and the generation of new 
concentrations of value (Baldwin and Clark 2004, Fixson and Park 2006). Modularization 
involves splitting up the functional elements of a product/process/system and assigning them 
to decoupled components according to a formal, specified architecture (Ulrich 1995). It also 
involves specifying the interface rules which govern how the components interact, and the 
standardized tests which verify that the components work well together (Baldwin and Clark 
2004). Modular designs can adapt economically to changes in functional needs because 
improvements can be made without undercutting the functionality of the system as a whole. 
Few studies have combined these two lenses to investigate how market liberalization, the 
customers’ operating environment, and the features of new designs influence process 
  1innovation in CoPS projects, and particularly in infrastructure projects. This is the motivation 
for this study. Specifically, we investigate whether the assessments of the innovations by the 
developer and customers are homogenous, or heterogeneous and conflicting, and how these 
actors align innovations with their business needs. We also investigate what makes the project 
coalition (Winch 2003) invest in building new technology into a CoPS definition, while 
rejecting other innovations that presumably could also bring collective value. The 
understanding of process innovation matters to help firms increase productivity and gain 
competitive advantage, or enact government policy (Reichstein and Salter 2006). The 
understanding of how this happens in infrastructure development has especial significance in 
light of its socio-economic importance. The UK, for example, spent an estimated £26bn on 
infrastructure in 2006 (Brown 2006), whereas investment just for realizing the trans-European 
transport network comes to more than €600 billion up to 2020 (Van Miert Group 2003).  
Our research method involves an in-depth multiple case study of the extent ten 
innovations were adopted in a capital programme (encompassing a set of interrelated projects)  
to expand one of the world’s busiest international airports, owned by a private firm. This is an 
important setting given the role of airports in economic development and the growing demand 
for air travel.
1 Further, it illustrates the recent trend of using private equity (through 
privatization, private-finance, and public-private partnerships) to promote new infrastructure, 
influenced by the neo-liberal discourse linking market pricing, deregulation, and private 
ownership (Henisz et al. 2005). The UK has long taken the lead in this approach, having 
issued almost £3.5bn in bonds to fund private-financed infrastructure in 2006 (Tett 2006). 
Private equity firms (e.g., pension funds, banks, insurance companies) are also venturing into 
infrastructure to respond to pressure to achieve maximum diversification and hedge longevity 
risk. From 2004 to 2006, infrastructure deals rose from £33.8bn to about £75bn (Hughes 
2007).  
All our cases relate to innovations aiming at reducing the airport construction costs or 
improving service quality. The role of the project developer is akin to that of systems 
integrators in other CoPS environments (Prencipe 1997, Hobday 1998, Davies 2004, Davies 
et al. 2006). The developer must integrate the needs of customers and end-users in the design 
briefs in light of a regulatory framework, the project constraints set by business strategy (e.g., 
budget, schedule, quality), and the production capabilities of suppliers (Figure 1).  
                                                           
1 The number of passengers is expected to soar to an annual rate of over 7bn worldwide by 2020 (ACI 2005). 
 















































































































































Figure 1 – Stakeholder Groups Influencing New Infrastructure Development: Conceptually 
(Left) and for the Research Setting (Right) 
 
The system solutions specified in the design briefs provide the basis from which the developer 
commissions design, manufacturing, and construction works to suppliers, and manages the 
projects and their interfaces. We research the selection environment in terms of: (1) 
innovation costs and benefits as perceived by the developer and customers, (2) novelty of the 
technological elements relative to the stakeholders’ know-how, and (3) the regulatory 
framework. Flexible innovations involve modular technologies in which the functional 
elements exhibit decoupled, standard, and testable interfaces to the other airport subsystems.  
Our findings suggest that both project developer and customers can each occasionally 
champion or resist process innovations. Innovations succeed contingent upon these 
stakeholders, together with suppliers, agreeing collectively a financing and implementation 
plan reconciling their individual subjective assessments of the costs, benefits, as well as 
financial and technical risks. This reconciliation is easier to achieve when the stakeholder 
financing the innovation has control over the operations that make the investment pay off. 
Conversely, it is harder to achieve when the investment is financed from a number of project 
budgets, or when the degree to which it pays off depends from another stakeholder behaving 
in a specified way during the infrastructure lifetime. Stakeholders can agree collectively that 
the benefits of an innovation outweigh (or not) its costs and risks, even when novelty and lack 
of regulation induces different assessments of the particular costs, benefits, and risks. We also 
find that modularity does not suffice to ensure an innovation is adopted, and it is also not a 
necessary condition. The flexibility of modular architectures to respond to heterogeneity in 
  3stakeholder needs, however, can help the innovation champion develop a plan to finance and 
implement the innovation that moderates other stakeholders’ resistance. 
We structure the remaining of this paper as follows. First, we review related literature on 
innovation in CoPS and modularity. We then discuss our methods for data collection and 
analysis. The next section examines the empirical evidence of the process innovations and the 
stakeholder assessments. After summarizing our findings, we discuss the limitations of the 
research and implications for practice, theory, and policy.  
2. INNOVATION IN COPS AND MODULARITY 
We position this study against work on technological change in large technical systems 
(Mowery and Rosenberg 1982, Hughes 1983, 1987, Markard and Truffer 2006), and in 
particular, on innovation in CoPS (Hobday 2000a and b, Gann and Salter 2000, Geyer and 
Davis 2000, Davies et al. 2006). At the core of understanding technological change in 
complex systems is the selection environment (Nelson and Winter 1977). This notion 
suggests that the innovation process is steeped with uncertainty, where innovations compete 
with one another and with prevailing practice, succeeding by ex-post selection (Nelson and 
Winter 1977). It builds on the concepts of technological regime, the boundaries of achievable 
capabilities limited by the economical, physical, and other constraints (Hayami and Ruttan 
1971), and of natural trajectories, the heuristics and payoffs that exist when a technology is 
advanced in a certain direction (Rosenberg 1972, Dosi 1982). Firms innovate to fit better 
internal routines and perceived performance with the environment (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Innovating firms have greater propensity to incur the risks of innovation (Schumpeter 1942) 
because they compare with the best, whereas risk-adverse imitators compare to a broader 
population (Massini et al. 2005). 
The main elements of the selection environment include (Nelson and Winter 1977): (1) 
the benefits and costs expected by the organizations that will decide to adopt or not the 
innovation; (2) how consumer preferences, government legislation, and regulation influence 
the value of the innovation; and (3) the Schumpeterian processes of investment (expansion of 
the innovator) and imitation (by competitor) that are involved. In non-market selection 
environments, decisions to adopt an innovation are motivated by subjective assessments of 
profits, tastes and efficacy since producers’- and customers’ interests mix (Nelson and Winter 
1982). Successful innovations can be said to receive a ‘professional stamp of approval,’ 
moderated by constraints on spending limits and regulation (ibid.) 
  4Various scholars have used this construct to explain the trajectories of new technologies in 
complex systems (e.g., Davies 1996, Islas 1997, Glynn 2002, Markard and Truffer 2006). 
Successful technologies must simultaneously realize cost-savings economies of scale 
(improve efficiency in production and services) and scope (provide a broader range of 
services), as well as overcome the power of institutional interests and the commitments to 
particular technologies in sunk costs (Davies 1996). Resistance to innovation stemming from 
lock-in effects, or path dependencies (David 1985), can be particular high in attempts to 
innovate infrastructures due to the constraints defined by existing systems, and the legacies of 
the technologies they embody (Gann and Salter 2000, Walker 2000, Magnussion et al. 2005, 
Marckard and Truffer 2006, Bergh et al. 2007). The market liberalization of large technical 
systems and enduring support by government policies, however, can moderate strong path 
dependencies and barriers to innovation (Marckard and Truffer 2006). 
The flexibility stemming from modular design architectures also affects technological change 
(Baldwin and Clark 2004). Modularity can be a driving force behind the success of some 
major innovative firms, whereas the lack of modularity may help explain the fall of other 
players (Baldwin and Clark 2000). In market environments, consumers can ask to substitute 
or remove existing modules, or add new ones, to come up with a product that suits their taste 
and needs (Baldwin and Clark 2000). In CoPS environments, modularity helps to address the 
heterogeneity of interests and needs across project stakeholders (Baldwin and Clark 2004). 
Further, modularity helps these actors build options into the design definition, which they can 
exercise over time if uncertainties resolve favourably (Baldwin and Clark 2004). Stated 
differently, modularity enacts the managerial value of designing complex systems as near-
decomposable systems (Simon 1962). Of course, modularity does not come for free since the 
search for solutions decomposing an integral system into a modular system of equivalent 
performance can be difficult (Baldwin and Clark 2004). Further, an overly high investment on 
modularization involves costly cycling behaviour that may not pay itself off through 
corresponding gains in performance improvement (Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004).  
Recently, scholars have combined the two approaches to study innovation in large technical 
systems. Watson (2004), for example, employs the two lenses to investigate the commercial 
success of the combined cycle gas turbine. The study uncovers how the low capital cost was 
essential to enter in the deregulated energy market, whereas technological flexibility was 
essential to penetrate in markets as diverse as power, plant equipment, and aircraft engines. 
Our study also combines the two lenses, but uses a CoPS programme as the research setting. 
We next discuss how we set off to investigate these issues. 
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3. METHODS 
Our research method involves building theory from multiple case studies (Eisenhardt 1989, 
Yin 1994, Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). We examine the processes to adopt potentially ten 
innovations across four projects. Our theoretical sample includes innovations that were 
adopted, as well as others that were rejected or abandoned mid-course in a project. In 
particular, we searched for “polar types” (Eisenhardt 1989), extreme cases illustrating upfront 
rejections and acceptances of the innovations. The complexity of the selection environment 
and the modularity of the innovations both vary from low to high. Incremental innovations 
were not new in airport systems (i.e., the project coalition was imitating), whereas radical 
innovations were new in airport systems. We developed our analysis by playing iteratively 
data against the constructs. We used tabular cross-comparisons to test the plausibility of our 
insights (Miles and Huberman 1994), searching for new data to rule out alternative 
explanations, replicate findings, and elaborate our insights (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). 
We also made a number of presentations to specialised audiences, and gradually refined the 
research scope, identified the limitations, and clarified our contributions.  
RESEARCH SETTING AND SUMMARY OF CASES  
Our research setting was a €6.1bn (2006 prices) airport expansion programme encompassing 
a number of projects, including terminal buildings, aircraft stands and taxiways, a baggage 
handling system, and an intra-terminal train. The airport was operated by a subsidiary 
(Airport Ltd.) of a public limited company (Airport plc.) which owned over six airports. 
Airport plc. set up a business unit to develop and manage the whole programme. This unit, in 
turn, encompassed more than ten project development units (project developers). Some of the 
project customers were business units of Airport plc. (e.g., retail unit) and of Airport Ltd. 
(e.g., airport operations, security) (Figure 1). Other customers were external to Airport plc., 
such as the main airline occupying the new terminal campus, and the customs & immigration 
department occupying the new immigration hall. These customers represented the market of 
the airport (Hughes 1987). The supplier base was a fragmented myriad of firms, as typical of 
the construction industry (Cacciatori and Jacobides 2005). Table 1 summarizes the ten cases 
and the chronologies of the processes of adoption or rejection.   7
Table 1 - Summary of the Process Innovations for the Ten Cases 
Project   Case  Description  Innovation 
adopted  
Chronology of the process of adopting/rejecting the innovation  
Baggage 
reconciliati
on system  
Develop a reconciliation system, and integrate it with the baggage 
handling system, to enable baggage handlers scan bags at the collection 
point before loading them into the aircrafts  
 
Yes  
2002, Need identified (current system will be ‘old’ by opening date) 
2004, Launch of negotiations with baggage handlers and loaders 
2005, Airline authorizes development and approves funding  




Use radio frequency identification (RFID) technology to identify and trace 
bags. RFID relies on chip tags attached to products for storing and 




2002, Use of RFID ruled out in the new baggage handling system 
2003, Las Vegas Int. Airport announces $125m investment into RFID 
2004,  Airline asks developer to leave open option to use RFID 




























car park  
Offer premium passengers possibility to check-in baggage at the car park. 
This involves building a bridge to extend the baggage handling system 




2002, Airline requests provision to offer baggage check-in at kerbside 
on the forecourt on top of the multi-storey car park 




Augment the strength of airfield pavements to cope with larger planes, 
while decreasing their thickness to reduce the amount of bulk materials. 
This involves developing new, high-performance concrete mixes  
 
Yes 
2000-02, Slipforming trials confirming viability of F7 concrete mix; 
develop specifications for batching plant and slipform paver 




Provide Multi Access Ramp Stands (MARS) that can park one large 
aircraft or two small aircrafts. This triplicates the number of services to 
provide at the aircraft stand , including power, fuel pods, boarding bridges 
 
Yes 
2000, Airbus unveils A380 to enter service in 2005  
2003, Five airport airlines order A380, but not the occupier airline  
2004, Project developer agrees to provide four MARS stands 













Provide economical aircraft pavement stands, where thickness is greater in 
areas subjected to high loads (where the wheels park) and lower in areas 




2002, Launch of discussions to change the structural configuration of 
the pavement of the aircraft stands 






  Vehicle 
occupancy  
security 
Use closed circuit television (CCTV), a network of video cameras 
transmitting a signal to a set of monitors, as the basis of the vehicle 
occupancy security system (VOSS) of the train carriages 
 
No 
2001, Intelligent CCTV solution documented as the preferred solution  
2003, Wiring looms to connect CCTV cameras installed in the trains 




Use wireless signs to display way-finding information (necessary to ensure 
passengers can find their way effortlessly) inside the terminal buildings 
 
No 
2002, Need for an integrated passenger information system, making 
extensive use of wireless technologies, is documented 
2005-06, Wireless technology is ruled out in the way finding signs 
IRIS for  
immigratio
n control  
Use Iris Recognition Immigration System (IRIS) to identify registered 
travellers when they present themselves at an automated barrier. This 
biometric offers high accuracy and speed of recognition 
 
Yes 
2002, First trial to test technology with 200 passengers 
2003, Home office issues notice to supply and maintain technology 
























Provide self-service check-in kiosks and bag drop facilities, assuming that 
80% of the passengers will either arrive with their boarding pass printed 
online, or will check-in at self-service kiosks at the terminal 
 
Yes 
2002, terminal building layout and equipment designed, assuming 
50% self-service check-in (mostly regular business travellers) 
2006, assume 80% self-service check-in (for business travellers and 
non-IT conversant people like ‘once-a-year’ family) DATA COLLECTION 
The field work took place between May 2004 and July 2007 as part of a broader research 
programme. When we set off to collect data, the conceptual designs were substantially 
developed, and physical execution was progressing concurrently with design detailing. Data 
collection involved: (i) face-to-face interviews, lasting from one to two-and-a-half hours with 
representatives of the project developers, customers, and suppliers (Table 2); (ii) thorough 
analysis of over one hundred documents, including drawings, specifications, design standards 
and briefs, and clips from the trade and business press; and (iii) on-site observations, 
including attendance to supplier presentations, site tours, and visits to supplier shops. All 
interviews were tape recorded, transcribed, and organised into a digital database. We also had 
numerous informal conversations with our hosts. We subsequently summarised our findings 
in write-ups about each project, which we shared and discussed with our interviewees.  
 
Table 2 Interviews per Case 
Job roles of Interviewees (number of  interviews)  Case 






at car park  
Production leader (2); project leader 
(2); design manager (1); 
development manager (1); assistant 
project leader (1); operations 




architect (1); site 
manager (1) 
designer (1) 
Airline, airport Ltd.: Project 
director (2); chief architect (1); 
head of development (2); 
seconded designer (1) ; quality 
manager (1)  
High-performing 
pavements 
MARS   stands 
Reconfigured 
aircraft stands 
Project leader (1); design manager 
(1); development manager (1); head 





Airline, airport Ltd.: Project 
director (2); chief architect (1); 
head of development (2); 
seconded designer (1) 
Train 
Security system 
Project leader (1); design manager 
(1); head of design (1); development 
manager (2) 
Designer (1)   Airport Ltd.: operations manager 
(2) 
Wireless way 
finding system  
design managers (2); head of 
development (2); project leader (2); 
buildings director (2) 
Designers (2)   Airport Ltd.: way finding expert 
(1); Retail director (2) 
IRIS for  
immigration 
control  
Project leader (2); design manager 
(2); development manager (2); head 
of development (2); head of 
engineering (1); buildings director 
(2) 
Unavailable  Strategy and technology 
manager (1) (via e-mail) 
80% self-service 
check-in 
Project leader (1); design manager 
(2); development manager (2); head 
of development (2); head of 
engineering (1) 
Designers (2)  Airline,  airport Ltd.: Project 
director (2); chief architect (1); 
head of development (2); 
seconded designer (1) 
  84. ANALYSIS 
THE EFFECTS OF THE SELECTION ENVIRONMENT 
Extant theory characterizes the selection environment that innovators face in a CoPS project 
as highly bureaucratised and political, where the innovation can only succeed after extensive 
negotiations between a single (or a small number of) customers under a contract with the 
developer (Hobday 1998). Our findings reveal a more nuanced view where the complexity of 
the selection environment varies in different attempts to introduce process innovations. We 
first examine this complexity in terms of the perceived costs and benefits associated to each 
innovation, and the number of project budgets contributing to finance the innovation.  
 Assessments of Costs, Benefits, and Funding Sources 
We did not uncover evidence of rigorous quantitative cost-benefits analyses underpinning the 
decisions to adopt or reject an innovation. Rather, we found systematic evidence of the use of 
ballpark figures and subjective risk assessments in the decision-making process as typical in 
large-scale infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003) (Table 3). Two factors increased the 
complexity of the selection environment. First, the greater the number of project developers 
and customers affected by an innovation, the more difficult its adoption, because of the 
proportional complexity of the funding negotiations. Second, it was harder to adopt 
innovations if one or more project developers were expected to fund the innovation, but the 
investment would only pay off if a customer would commit to operate in a specified way after 
opening the terminal, i.e., the developer was incurring most of the financial risk. 
  9Table 3 Summary of the Analysis of the Innovation Costs, Benefits, and Relevant Regulation 
 















n system  
Moderate 
Airline expected to 
fund, but based upon 
cost estimate provided 
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to cost less than 
10 cents, it’s no 








security:  “It could 
slash the annual 
€1bn bill for lost 
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“It’s tough call to 
manage 
compromise 
between costs and 
aesthetics” 
(project leader) 
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flexibility to make 
changes; benefits 
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  10The high complexity of the selection environment in terms of costs and benefits, for example, 
impacted negatively the airline request for the project developers to build provisions allowing 
for baggage check-in at the forecourt on top of the multi-storey car park. This new service 
involved the construction of a bridge extending the baggage handling system from inside the 
terminal building into the car park, thereby affecting at least three projects. The airline was 
originally keen to offer the service to its premium clients, and this aim was spelled out in the 
first design brief. However, the airline and the developers did not agree a plan to fund the 
work. This, together with perceptions that the benefits from selling this premium service 
would not offset the cost of constructing the bridge, led to the abandonment of this 
innovation. It remains unclear, however, the extent to which the demand for this service 
would not offset the investment since 40 percent of the passengers using the new terminal fly 
in the premium categories. 
In contrast, some innovations were more likely to go ahead because they faced a relatively 
simple selection environment. The change in the structural configuration of the aircraft stands 
was championed by the airfield project developer interested in reducing the construction 
costs. The airfield project developer was also benefiting directly from the adoption of this 
innovation. This was equally the case with the adoption of new concrete mixes to develop 
high-performing airfield pavements:   
“The airfield pavements will lay on an area of clay fill several metres thick. Incentives to re-use 
the soft clays excavated during the massive earthworks were irresistible, even if this meant a 
complete rethink of the concrete mix and base layer design. The advantages were obvious: 
cement production rates were higher and the depth of the pavements was significantly reduced. 
An added bonus was reducing truck movements by 13,000 overall” (Design engineer 2005) 
In between the extremes, there were innovations facing moderately complex cost-benefit 
trade-offs. The adoption of the MARS stands, for example, meant that the project developer 
would incur an additional cost of €0.45-0.75m per stand, but the main airline adamantly 
refused to signal whether it planed to purchase A380s in the future. As stated by the airline 
CEO in 2005: “A380 may well have a role in our long-term fleet development programme, 
but I’ve never subscribed to the concept of ‘buy now while stocks last.’” The developer 
decided to incur the financial risk and make the investment, cognizant that five other airport 
carriers planned to purchase super jumbos. Thus, the stands could be used by those carriers if 
the main airline ended up not purchasing the A380s. As put by the project leader (2005):  
“When we started designing the terminal, we had to bear in mind that there was no absolute 
certainty in the business. The main occupier airline can go bust, and major international carriers 
  11will have A380s. I believe the main occupier will be forced to fly A380s for competitive 
reasons. I think (‘MARSing stands’) is the right thing to do.”  
We next discuss how the availability, or lack, of regulation affected the innovation process. 
The Effects of Regulation 
The complexity of the selection environment could be moderated or aggravated by regulation 
affecting the innovation. In the case of using CCTV inside the train cars, for instance, the 
perceived costs that the developer had to incur escalated after the interpretation of the security 
statutes evolved from a concept of threat detection into one of threat assessment. The latter 
would demand a new application of CCTV technology, involving the development of new 
science (algorithms to assess images), and the use of a greater number of cameras to increase 
coverage. While Airport Ltd. was interested in adopting a CCTV-based solution to eliminate 
the reliance on operational staff, the new understanding meant that the perceived benefits no 
longer offset the capital and maintenance costs. Accordingly, the project developer shelved 
the CCTV plans and settled for a man-based operational solution: 
“Until we consulted with the Dept. of Transport, we hadn’t appreciated the requirements 
involved in the threat assessment. All we had in the briefing was that we should maintain 
segregation between departing and arriving passengers and objects. Now, when you get to the 
nitty-gritty of what that means, it means a lot of different things to different people” (project 
leader 2005) 
In contrast, the commitment of the home office to help the immigration & customs 
department implement the IRIS technology was essential to overcome the complexity of the 
selection environment, albeit the IRIS strategy and technology manager (2006) stating that 
“the dynamics of introducing IRIS is probably no different from introducing any other major 
change to an established way of working.” Both the airport and the airline saw major benefits 
stemming from this innovation, but these were hard to quantify. Nevertheless, the home office 
was committed to incurring the bulk of the innovation costs within the framework of a 
Government’s programme to modernise and strengthen border control. This meant that for 
each stakeholder, the assessment of the benefits outweighed the costs, such as the costs that 
the developer incurred in postponing the design freeze for the immigration hall, and the costs 
that the Airport plc. and the airlines incurred in supporting the pilot scheme: 
“This is an excellent example of the Home Office working in partnership with other 
stakeholders to make the most of science and explore secure and improved passenger clearance 
at immigration control” (home office minister 2002) 
  12We discuss next how the novelty of the technology in relation to the stakeholders’ know-how 
could generate heterogeneity in their predisposition to incur financial and technological risks, 
and contribute accordingly to shape their position as an innovator or an imitator. 
Innovating or Imitating? 
While radical technologies are more likely to generate heterogeneous assessments from 
different social actors (Bijker 1995), the assessments may not necessarily be conflicting (see 
Table 4). The IRIS technology, an untested application of new science, generated different but 
compatible stakeholder assessments. The airline wanted to be renowned for taking a lead in 
technological advances, as its manager for government affairs explained (2006): “Iris 
recognition will complement other initiatives such as check-in online and print your boarding 
card, which substantially reduce the amount of time our customers need to spend in queues.” 
Likewise, Airport Ltd was interested in using IRIS to improve efficiency while delivering a 
‘greater passenger experience’ (Head of product development 2006). The home office, in turn, 
was interested in ‘exploring the ability of the latest biometric technologies to simplify existing 
procedures, and make immigration controls ever more secure.’ (Director of border control 06)  
  13Table 4 Novelty and Assessment of Risks Associated to each Process Innovation  
 
Case  Novelty  Viewpoint of the developer   Viewpoint of the customer  
Baggage 
reconciliatio





know-how   
Innovator  
“To be honest, it is like we [developer] forced 
the airline to make the right decision, which is 
a bit bizarre. But this is also political, because 
we did not want to fund it” (project leader 
2005)  
Airline: Innovator, but concerned with threat 
of industrial action  
“Migrating to a new system is difficult. We 
have to train 400 baggage handlers, and 











“Great theory. Let someone else test it [RFID] 
first. We want to see it used in other airports, 
so we can understand how it was specified, 
and how it works.” (Baggage production 
leader 2004) 
Airline: Innovator, but  business  case is not 
compelling 
“RFID is relevant since we sell minimum 
connecting times, but the financial case does 
not yet stand up due to the cost of tags and 
lack of scale economies” (Airline CEO 2007)* 
Baggage 
check-in at 





Not interested  
“We were happy to scrap it [the baggage 
bridge under the people bridge] 1 ½ years 
ago” (System designer 2005) 
Airline: Innovator  
“We originally requested the developer to 
safeguard provision for check-in on car park 







been used in 
other settings  
Innovator 
“If we had stuck with our established mix, the 
slab would have had to be 800mm thick, well 
beyond the capacity of modern slipform 
pavers” (design engineer 2005) 













“Failure to act now could mean the loss of a 
strategically important element of traffic to 
competitor airports” (Project leader 2005) 
Airline: Innovator without disclosing thinking  
“What we told them is that we may plan to 
have big aircrafts, but until they arrive we will 







before in the 
airport industry 
Innovator 
“It’s standard practice to build a continuous 
thick slab across stands, when we just need a 
thick central lane. I’m challenging this design” 
(project leader 2005) 
Airport Ltd: Imitator  
  “We do it [thick, continuous slab] because 
this is the way it has always been built, and it 








was new  
Imitator 
“The amount of CCTV coverage and coding 
to assess a threat remotely was prohibitive” 
(development manager 2005) 
Airport Ltd: Innovator   
“Initially, our brief said “you must make sure 
nothing is left in the train,” and we thought it 
would be nice to have an intelligent system” 









“Wireless can be an option, but is the project 
prepared to pay that? If it is going to cost 
more, we have to have good reasons” 
(technical leader 2006) 
Airport Ltd: Innovator  
“We want to put it [way finding signs] as posh 
as we can, and we want to deliver graphics 
on screen-based technology” (technical 
leader 2006) 






fresh science  
Innovator (home office) 
“It is vital that we harness the technology 
available today to assist staff in continuing to 
identify those arriving passengers who pose a 
risk to the integrity of our border” (IRIS 
strategy and development manager 06) 
Airline, Airport Ltd: Innovators  
“IRIS will complement other initiatives to 
reduce amount of time”  (airline CEO 2002) 
“We are always looking at new and innovative 
ways of improving passenger journeys” 






taking place  
Innovator, as long as they do not have to pay 
“This issue is cost reimbursable; we will tell 
them [airline] roughly the cost, and they will 
decide whether they want it” (Head of 
Engineering 2007) 
Airline: Innovator  
“This is a new concept and design, and is a 
direct result of the e-revolution. Passengers 
will be guided through the terminal building by 
their state of readiness” (airline architect 06) 
(*) In 2006, there were 6,000 RFID-enabled airport gates around the world (Passenger Terminal World 2007) 
In contrast, the airport developer and the airline agreed in taking the role of imitator in regards 
to introducing RFID technology. Their subjective concerns regarding the innovation were, 
however, different. The airline was reluctant to invest in the technology due to the perceived 
  14high costs of the RFID tags.
2 It was also sceptical about the potential benefits of RFID in 
reducing lost baggage, as presented by the suppliers (‘I don’t buy it because the reasons for 
lost baggage are numerous and I don’t think RFID can solve the problem’). In contrast, the 
developer’s chief concern was the untested nature of the technology. The developer wanted to 
minimize the likelihood of technical problems impacting baggage handling operations, which 
would affect airport service provision (‘we tend to follow onto these things rather than lead’). 
Hence, both stakeholders agreed to act as imitators, despite perhaps a potential collective 
benefit, and considered the average of the airport and airline industries as their reference 
groups (Massini et al. 2005): 
“[In baggage handling] We do not prototype - it is one of the lessons we learned. If we got a 
problem, we try using existing technology to solve that problem. That is not to say that we are 
not open to innovation. But, for a new technology in baggage handling, you are incurring risks 
until you put it in a real life scenario and throw in everything the general passenger is inclined 
to.” (production leader 2005, emphasis added) 
In other situations, a radical innovation could generate conflicting perceptions of 
technological risks, even when the selection environment from an economic and regulatory 
perspective was relatively simple. This was the case with the resistance faced by the 
developer against the reconfiguration of the aircraft stands. The developer was interested in 
ruling out an investment in safeguarding the option to change the aircraft stand configuration 
in the future. Investments in project safeguards aim at operationalizing strategic optionlike 
thinking into integral architectures (Gil 2007). They can be attractive to project managers 
when they require a limited capital investment, and the assumed likelihood that they will pay 
off is high (ibid.). Here, the developer believed that this specific safeguarding practice was a 
waste of money, representing a path dependency (David 1985) from the days when new 
airport developments were publicly financed. Yet, it took the developer more than two years 
of debate with Airport Ltd to persuade the latter on the value of the innovation:  
“Aircraft stands are designed and built for 30 to 50 years. We do it [a thick continuous slab] 
because of the perception it would take massive construction work in the future to change the 
stand configuration otherwise. However, the probabilities to move stands are low. In one 
existing terminal, we are now changing it for the first time after 25 years! And we replaced the 
pavements anyway because we had to move the fuel connections, change the underground 
services, and the pavements had deteriorated a bit.” (project leader 2005) 
                                                           
2 In 2001, the cost of RFID technology (read rates in the range of 95-100 percent) was still 4, 5 times higher 
than that of barcode technology (read rates in the range of 65-85 percent) (Dew 2006). 
 
  15Theory also suggests that upfront investments in safeguards are more attractive when they are 
associated to decoupled elements because modularity can limit the capital investment (Gil 
2007). We examine next how the technological features affected the innovation process. 
THE EFFECTS OF MODULARITY  
Our findings suggest that the modularity of the functional elements is not a sufficient or 
necessary condition to ensure that the corresponding innovation succeeds (Table 5). This 
corroborates recent work suggesting that successful commercial innovations in competitive 
markets can occasionally be associated with high-performance integral architectures (Fixson 
and Park 2006). The wireless way-finding signs were readily available in a modular fashion, 
for example, but the developer could not find a compelling business case justifying the capital 
investment. Likewise, the RFID technology was largely built upon modular elements, but the 
stakeholders were unwilling to pioneer its adoption. The lack of modularity, however, is also 
not a reason strong enough per se to make stakeholders rule out an investment in an 
innovation. The reconfiguration of the aircraft stands was a move toward integral 
configurations in the sense that the architecture of the stands would be closely tied up to the 
assumed aircraft fleet configuration. Yet, this innovation was embraced after the developer 
persuaded Airport Ltd. that the cost of building a flexible asset did not pay off over time.  
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Analysis of the Design Architecture 
Case 
















to identify bags going 
into containers  
Feasible  
There is time left in the
development 
programme to test & 
commission 
“We spent time talking with the customer, 
prototyped some screen designs and
placed some ‘hooks’ in the system. When 
we get the OK, we will work with the 















R&D work still 
ongoing 
Difficult 
Novelty meant need to 
pioneer tests 
 “We did not adopt it [RFID technology], 
but the terminal buildings and the 
baggage handling system are prepared to 












to offer premium 
service  
Feasible 
Enough time to test & 
commission 
“If you look at the drawings, you see it 
was a very tight area, maintenance would 
be difficult, and fire access would be 









other projects  
One-to-one 




Pilot tests could be 
performed ex-ante 
 “We were always confident we could do 
it. After all, we regularly slipform 
motorway barriers up to 2.4m high” 












MARS stands build 
operational flexibility 
Feasible 
MARS stands are not 
technically complex 
“To MARS a stand, you have to put in 
underground two more fuel lines, two 
more thick lanes, two more fuel pods, 
drive more pits on the floor. It is not 










of aircraft fleet 
One-to-one 
Reconfiguration aims 
to cut construction 
costs  
Feasible 
Available  machinery 
enables innovation 
“In the past, pavements were laid by hand
and was inefficient to stop & restart the 
work to vary the thickness. There are still 
issues with pavers, but we can have 
smooth transitions” (project leader 05) 
CCTV 
technology 













Unclear how to test 
threat assessment  
“The wiring looms are safeguarded for 
cameras to go in. Nothing precludes 
going into that direction in the future
should IT capabilities enable to carry out 
















Wireless signs by definition are 
technologically decoupled elements 

















“The only way we can work out the 
immigration hall arrangement is doing a 
trial, but we need to agree some design 
principles about where the services are 

















“I don’t have a problem moving the self-
service check-in desks because we are 
servicing them from below the slab. The 
bag drops, however, have to stay where 
they are” (design manager 06)  
 
Our findings suggest nonetheless that modularity may moderate the resistance of stakeholders 
to adopt new technologies in the sense that it makes it easier to devise and agree collectively 
an implementation plan reconciling the individual stakeholder assessments. Both the 
developer and the airline, for example, were interested in adopting a new baggage 
reconciliation system. The decision to migrate over 400 unionized baggage handlers to a new 
  17system, however, was a protracted process because the airline administrators wanted to avoid 
industrial relations issues motivated by union concerns that the innovation could lead to job 
losses or deteriorate working conditions. The modular interaction between the baggage 
handling and reconciliation systems made it possible for the developer to progress efficiently 
with execution of the baggage handling system for three years albeit the lack of a 
commitment from the airline about the new reconciliation system. 
Likewise, the cameras of the CCTV solution interacted in a modular fashion with other train 
subsystems (metal skin of the cars). Developers managed to postpone the procurement of the 
CCTV technology, albeit agreeing to install the wiring looms when the fabrication of the train 
cars started in 2003. (The cables were integral to the cars because they ran between the inner 
and outer skins). As a result, developers incurred limited sunk costs after they abandoned the 
CCTV solution in 2005, while leaving the option open for the future. As put by the design 
manager (2005): “Perhaps CCTV technology can evolve in the way baggage screening 
machines have and then it will allow efficiently detecting and assessing threats. If that 
happens, the cable looms are already there.”  
Modular technologies could also be attractive due to their flexibility to accommodate 
economically foreseeable evolution in design requirements (Balwin and Clark 2000). The 
supplier of the reconciliation system, for example, structured a database enabling end-users to 
extract tailored reports. This flexible ‘toolkit’ (von Hippel and Katz 2002) enabled the airline 
to postpone the development of reports until more information became available. Less 
spending upfront increased the attractiveness of the innovation. Likewise, the development of 
new concrete mixes reducing the thickness of the pavements by up to 200mm (leading to a 25 
per cent reduction in the bulk materials needed) generated transferable know-how. The 
developer applied the know-how to build over 675,000 m2 of airfield pavements in the new 
campus, but the know-how remains available to apply in future airport developments.  
Modularity also facilitated the aim of the airline to operate assuming that 80% of its 
customers will check-in online or use self-service kiosks. This innovation came rather late in 
the programme, but the airline viewed it fundamental to ensure its competitiveness3. The 
modularity of the check-in kiosks limited the cost of its implementation. However, the cost of 
moving the bag drop points located next to the ‘old’ assisted check-in desks was too high 
because they were integral to the baggage handling system and to the floor penetrations. 
                                                           
3 The average cost of checking in a passenger through a human agent is US$3.05, while kiosk check-in is 
between US$0.14 and $0.32 and online check-in is even less (Forrester Research 2007) 
 
  18Accordingly, the two stakeholders agreed a ‘satisficing’ solution (Simon 1962) that reused the 
original layout of the assisted bag drops into the new layout for the self-service kiosks.  
We summarize next the analysis of our findings in light of the two theoretical lenses. 
5. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Our findings systematically suggest that the champion of a process innovation in new 
infrastructure development can be the project developer or customer, more often than not 
teaming up with a supplier. Hence, each stakeholder occasionally needs to persuade, or be 
persuaded by, another party that an investment to innovate pays off. Figure 2 maps the ten 
cases according to the perceived novelty of the innovation (X-axis), the number of developer 
and customer groups relevant to the innovation (Y-axis), and the modularity of the functional 
elements (size of the bubble marker). As the number of relevant stakeholders goes up, the 
differences in subjective assessments are likely to increase in number and scope because each 
actor brings a different view of the world. This makes it harder for the innovation champion 
to resolve interfaces and agree a satisfactory financing and operational scheme, or 
paraphrasing Nelson and Nelson (2003), it makes adoption contingent upon the champion’s 
ability to find answers, acceptable to the other relevant actors, to the questions of how and 
why the innovation works, and of what the operating characteristics are likely to be. 
 
Figure 2 – Map of Process Innovations as a function of Selection Environment elements 
  19(novelty, number of relevant stakeholders) and Modularity 
 
Our findings also suggest that novelty is not a determinant factor since we observed both 
incremental and radical innovations being adopted and rejected. Novelty appears to induce, 
however, more negative perceptions of technological and financial risks, often aggravated by 
uncertainty stemming from the lack of established regulations. Hence, the innovation 
champion needs to put more effort, time, and negotiation skills to persuade other parties to 
adopt radical innovations. Failure to do so at the project outset can be especially deleterious 
for moving forward with integral innovations because the adoption costs are likely to go up as 
the project unfolds to account for the reworking of more interfaces. Finally, our findings also 
suggest that investments to modularize architectures − which can be particularly costly in the 
case of physical systems (Baldwin and Clark 2004) − enable to moderate resistance to 
innovate, but are neither sufficient or necessary per se to ensure the innovation gets adopted. 
6. LIMITATIONS  
We limited our study to the fine-grained analysis of the viewpoints of two stakeholder groups, 
following recommendations for rigorous qualitative research (Van de Ven 2007). Suppliers 
however, bring valuable know-how to the infrastructure development process which they gain 
from working for multiple clients (Geyer and Davies 2000, Reichstein and Salter 2006). The 
immigration authority, for example, teamed up with suppliers of IRIS technology to trial a 
pilot scheme, whereas the development of the new concrete mixes resulted from close 
collaboration between the developer and suppliers. It merits further research when and how to 
involve effectively suppliers in new infrastructure development.   
The difficulties to generalize insights from a single research setting are another key limitation 
of this study (Yin 1984). Unarguably, airports matter to boost the international 
competitiveness of state economies, and airport projects are far from being unique even if 
many still remain public assets.
4 Airport developers are, however, the suppliers of the 
particularly volatile airline industry. Hence, it merits investigating how our insights apply to 
other privatized infrastructure sectors serving less volatile consumer environments.  
Finally, our work has parallels with the socio-constructivist view of innovation, which 
suggests that at the outset there is not such thing as a new technology, but as many new 
                                                           
4 In 2006, there were over 87 airport projects worldwide representing an investment around $100bn 
(Passenger Terminal World 2007) 
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meaning amalgamating the vested interests of the different actors (Pinch and Bijker 1987, 
Bijker 1995) co-evolves with the stabilization of the technology characteristics. This process 
is subjected to pragmatic choices, analytic analyses, value judgments, and the power and 
capability of individual actors to secure collective outcomes, or as Bijker’s (1995) 
summarizes, ‘to politics.’ Indeed, we observed stakeholders playing games when trying to sell 
or kill an innovation. This calls for more research on politics in the CoPS innovation process.  
7. IMPLICATIONS 
Our findings have important implications for practice. Infrastructure businesses are at risk if 
the capital projects they commission fail to limit the sunk costs in the face of long pay back 
periods and high discount rates. Thus, it is understandable that businesses scrutinize every 
decision to build a new technology into the design definition. Yet, private infrastructure 
developers want to be capable of shaping, configuring, and reconfiguring their capital assets 
so as to respond effectively to changing markets and technological opportunities - what Teece 
et al. (1997) term a strategic capability.  
Major international airport hubs, for example, are increasingly competing with one another to 
offer airlines the lowest minimum times to connect an inbound to an outbound flight without 
mishandling bags. This enables airlines to schedule more flights and boost passenger loyalty, 
which in turn boosts airport revenues from fees. ‘Our success means their success,’ observed 
the airline chief designer about the airport developer. Admittedly, airport developers need to 
balance the needs of airlines with their in-house interests to grow revenues from retail 
activities. This is a delicate balance in the face of the complexity of the selection environment 
and decision-makers’ reliance on ballpark figures and subjective assessments. 
The ability to interpret rightly the selection environment is, however, a micro-foundation of a 
firm’s capability at positioning in a favorable ecosystem (Augier and Teece 2006). Thus, 
infrastructure developers want to set up governance structures at the project/programme levels 
that can give a share of voice in decision-making to all relevant customers proportional to the 
functions they represent. This can be enacted, for example, by co-locating developer and 
customer teams early on so they can share preliminary information, and inviting customers to 
be part of project boards so they can sign off design briefs. Such arrangements can enable 
infrastructure owners to create more situations where collective investments in innovations 
can individually benefit all firms relevant to the innovation, or in other words, to enact 
successfully distributed innovations (Coombs et al. 2003).  
  21There is also an important implication for theory. Our work uncovers the dynamics of process 
innovation affecting a type of system integrator ─ the business unit of an infrastructure owner 
delivering a capital programme ─ which has perhaps received less attention in scholarly 
literature. With multi-billion budgets to manage, these units can be as big as many publicly 
listed companies. While these units may not have manufacturing capabilities unlike other 
system integrators (Davies 2004), they are still responsible for financing and specifying a new 
asset that can effectively respond to the needs of customers. They do so by gathering intimate 
knowledge of those needs, as well as of the production capabilities of the suppliers, some of 
which are system integrators themselves (e.g., the supplier of the baggage handling system). 
Stated differently, they are the glue that joins customers and suppliers up to build a solution 
that works. Like other system integrators, the commercial success of these units is also a 
function of their capabilities, first, to incur calculated risks (particularly when customers are 
loath to disclose their strategic thinking); and second, to develop economical solutions that the 
infrastructure firm can adapt and replicate in subsequent capital programmes at lower cost.  
Finally, there is also an important implication for policy. We are increasingly witnessing 
governments using private equity to develop new infrastructure as international pressures of 
coercion, normative emulation, and competitive mimicry influence the adoption of market-
oriented reform (Henisz et al. 2005). These natural monopolies need to be regulated in 
economic terms to ensure owners do not operate against the public interest. This involves, for 
instance, capping the maximum allowable utilization charges and rate of return on investment, 
as well as setting service quality rebates to customers and consumers in case of low 
performance. Our study elucidates, however, that the commercial interests also impact on 
design and technological decisions. Given the contribution of CoPS development to 
technological spillovers (see Mowery and Langlois 1996, for example, on spillovers of 
defense infrastructure for civilian industry) and to the welfare of citizens, regulators (and 
commissions responsible for reviewing planning applications) may perhaps also want to look 
at process innovation.  
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